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PROTECTING PROFITS DERIVED FROM TRIBAL
RESOURCES: WHY THE STATE OF UTAH SHOULD
NOT HAVE THE POWER TO TAX NON-INDIAN OIL
AND GAS LESSEES ON THE NAVAJO NATION'S
ANETH EXTENSION: TEXACO, EXXON, AND UNION
OIL V. SAN JUAN COUNTY SCHOOL DISTRICT - A
CASE STUDY
Richard J. Ansson, Jr.*
L Introduction
Of course our whole national history has been one of expan-
sion .... That barbarians recede or are conquered, with the
attendant fact that peace follows their retrogression or conquest, is
due solely to the power of the mighty civilized races which have not
lost their fighting instinct, and which by their expansion are
gradually bringing peace into the red wastes where the barbarian
peoples of the world hold sway.
_ President Theodore Roosevelt'
As President Theodore Roosevelt's words indicate, expansion of the United
States' land base has always been an issue central to the United States'
domestic policies Indeed, the United States' political and economic well-
being has rested on its ability to control its landed interests.' Likewise, the
governmental entity that has controlled the land has also controlled the
resources within and upon it.4 Such control has enabled the governing
*B.A., 1994, University of Oklahoma; J.D., 1997, University of Oklahoma College of Law;
LL.M. candidate, 1998, University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law. Member, Choctaw
Nation of Oklahoma. Member, Creek Nation of Oklahoma. This author wishes to express his
sincere gratitude to Professor Katheleen Guzman for her thoughtful comments on this subject and
for her genuine interest in this research.
1. THEODORE ROOSEvELT, THE STRENUOUS LIFE, reprinted in THE STATE OF NATIVE
AMERICA: GENOCIDE, COLONIZATION, AND RESISTANCE 139, 139 (M. Annette Jaimes ed., 1992)
[hereinafter THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA].
2. See, e.g., JOHN R. HOWE, FROM THE REVOLUTION THROUGH THE AGE OF JACKSON 91-
174 (discussing how the United States' overriding interest in maintaining and securing its land
base helped stimulate the economy while eliminating foreign threat possibilities).
3. Id.
4. This resource base is fairly vast and includes minerals, water, agricultural production,
livestock production, grazing rights, etc.
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entities' citizens to reap the profits generated from those resources.
Accordingly, as the United States expanded, the federal government sought
to ensure that these priceless treasures remained within their possession and
control
Unfortunately, this federal insurance cost Native Americans. Indeed, as
Native American governmental entities lost their lands, they also lost control
over their land's valuable resources.' Even on lands retained by the Native
Americans, the federal government asserted its power to regulate those
resources These losses cost the American Indian governmental entities a
viable basis for economic survival.' Consequently, since the United States
encourages tribal development,9 the federal government should allow tribal
entities to have more control over their own resources and the profits derived
therefrom.
One such instance occurs when tribes try to obtain jurisdictional authority
over non-Indians on the reservation. Over the past fifteen years, the Supreme
Court has decided many cases concerning conflicting assertions of state and
5. See generally, e.g., Ward Churchill & Winona LaDuke, Native North America: The
Political Economy of Radioactive Colonialism, in THE STATE OF NATIVE AMERICA, supra note
1, at 241 (discussing the United States' land and resources policies with regard to Native
Americaus).
6. See generally, e.g., id. at 241-66.
7. Title to American Indian lands is actually owned by the United States. Johnson v.
McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 603 (1823). The land is held in trust for the tribes. See, e.g.,
GILBERT L. HALL, THE FEDERAL INDIAN-TRUST RELATIONSHIP 1-3 (2nd ed. 1981).
Congress assumed authority over American Indian relations under the Act of 1871. Act of
Mar. 3, 1871, 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1994). Congress, in the 1938 Mineral Leasing Act, determined that
American Indians should receive "the greatest return from their property" and that the Bureau of
Indian Affairs should insure such. S. REP. No. 75-985, at 2 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 75-1872, at
2 (1938). At least one scholar has argued that American Indians should have the right to
autonomy in any matters relating to internal self-government including sole control and
managenrent over their resources. See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Reconciling Federal and State
Power Inside Indian Reservations with the Right of Tribal Self-Government and the Process of
Self-Determination, 1995 UTAH L. REv. 1105, 1109-10 (1995).
8. See generally, e.g., Judith V. Royster, Mineral Development in Indian Country: The
Evolution of Tribal Control Over Mineral Resources, 29 TULSA L.J. 541, 544-45 (1994) (arguing
that tribal control over mineral resources is critical from economic, environmental, and regulatory
perspectives and in some circumstances may represent the best hope for economic development
on a reservation).
9. Since Congress passed the Wheeler-Howard Act of 1934, the federal government has
encouraged tribal self-government and tribal self-sufficiency. Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984
(codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)). This Act, however, sustained much
criticism between 1940-1962. During this period congressional hearings were held to facilitate
tribal termination. Nevertheless, the 1934 Act survived and regained its full force after 1962.
Indeed, President's Johnson and Nixon administrations helped pass many bills designed to
strengthen tribal governments and tribal sovereignty. See, e.g., Rebecca L. Robbins, Self-
Determination and Subordination - The Past, Present, and Future of American Indian
Governance, in THE STATE OF NATIvE AMERICA, supra note 1, at 87 (discussing the United
States reent desire to facilitate tribal self-government).
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tribal jurisdiction over various activities of non-Indians within reservations,
including hunting and fishing," property development," taxation, 12 and
mineral extraction. 3
This comment examines the conflicts that arise when the states and tribal
governments seek to tax non-Indian lessees. In recent years, the tribes and
states have competed over the right to tax energy development and
extraction. 4 Indeed, these conflicts were inevitable considering the relative
abundance of energy-producing natural resources located on reservations. 5
These conflicts eventually led the Supreme Court to declare, in Cotton
Petroleum v. New Mexico, that the tribes and states have concurrent taxation
jurisdiction over non-Indian lessees as long as the state does not substantially
burden the tribe or does not intrude too greatly into tribal and/or federal
affairs. 6
But should the tribes and the states always have concurrent taxation
jurisdiction over non-Indian lessees under such a scenario? Could a situation
arise that, if examined thoroughly, might lead a court to determine that
concurrent tax jurisdiction should be disallowed? This comment argues that
such a situation exists. 7 Indeed, in Texaco, Exxon, & Union Oil v. San Juan
County,8 the Utah Supreme Court, following Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New
Mexico, held that Utah could tax non-Indian lessees on the Aneth extension.
In Cotton Petroleum, the non-Indian lessee was held to be subject to both a
6% tribal severance tax and an 8% state severance tax. 9 Likewise, in
10. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 566 (1981) (allowing the state to
regulate non-Indian hunting and fishing activities on non-Indian fee land within a reservation).
11. See, e.g., Brendale v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492
U.S. 408, 412-13 (1989) (allowing a county to zone property within a reservation only if the
zoning regulations do not threaten the tribe's political integrity).
12. See, e.g., Ramah Navajo School Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue, 458 U.S. 832, 845-46
(1982) (forbidding a state from taxing a non-Indian contractor who was constructing a tribal
school).
13. See, e.g., Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 186-87 (1989) (allowing a
state to tax non-Indian lessees that produced oil on an Indian reservation).
14. Id.
15. Royster, supra note 8, at 542-43. Royster noted that Indian tribes, collectively, are the
third largest owners of mineral resources in the nation. Id. Moreover, Indian lands are estimated
to contain 3% of the nation's known oil and gas reserves, thirty percent of the coal west of the
Mississippi, and up to a third of this nation's uranium, as well as many other minerals. Id. The
market value of these minerals is estimated to exceed in excess of $1 billion. Id.
16. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 186-87.
17. Several articles have been written detailing the scope of concurrent taxation jurisdiction
over non-Indian lessees. The best of these articles is Royster, supra note 8. Another good article
on the subject details the scope of the Cotton Petroleum decision. Charley Carpenter, Note,
Preempting Indian Preemption: Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 39 CAmT. U. L. REV.
639 (1990).
18. 869 P.2d 942 (Utah 1994).
19. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 168.
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Texaco, Exxon, & Union Oil, the non-Indian lessees were held to be subject
to a Navajo and state severance tax.'
However, unlike Cotton Petroleum, Congress additionally provided,
pursuant to a 1933 Act (adding the Aneth Extension to Navajo lands), for the
State of Utah to collect 37-1/2% of the net royalties from production on the
Aneth Extension2' and mandated that Utah use these proceeds to benefit any
Navajo Indians residing therein.' Moreover, the Act was silent as to non-
Indian lessees being taxed by the state and local govemment. Consequently,
this comment will argue that the Utah Supreme Court should not have applied
the Cotton Petroleum doctrine to non-Indian oil and gas lessees since applying
the doctrine would intrude too greatly into federal and tribal affairs.
Part I of this comment outlines the concepts of Native American
sovereignty. Part I traces mineral rights developments in Indian country.
Part IV discusses the Utah Supreme Court's holding in Texaco, Exxon, &
Union Oil v. San Juan County School District. Part V considers the history
surrounding the 1933 Act and the addition of the Aneth Extension. Part VI
advocates that the Utah Supreme Court should not have allowed the Navajo
tribe and the state to share concurrent taxation jurisdiction over non-Indians
lessees. Part VII concludes that the aforementioned case presents a situation
were the Utah Supreme Court should have disallowed the state's taxation
jurisdiction over non-Indian lessees.
I. The Federal Government, the States, and the Tribes
A. Tribal Sovereignty
Before European discovery, the American Indians were independent
sovereign nations.' Each individual tribe had developed extensive political,
20. T aco, Exxon, & Union Oil, 869 P.2d at 945.
21. 1l at 943. The 1933 Act added 552,000 acres of land to the Navajo Reservation -
500,000 acres in the Paiute Strip and 52,000 acres along the Utah-Colorado border known as the
Aneth Extension. let at 944.
22. The 1933 Act specifically provides:
Should oil or gas be produced in paying quantities within the lands hereby added
to the Navajo Reservation, 37 1/2 per centum of the net royalties accruing
therefrom derived from tribal leases shall be paid to the state of Utah: Provided,
That said 37 1/2 per centum of said royalties shall be expended by the state of
Utah in the tuition of Indian children in white schools and/or in the building or
maintenance of roads across the lands described in section I hereof, or for the
benefit of the Indians residing therein.
Act of Mar. 1, 1933, ch. 160,47 Stat. 1418, 1418-19. In 1968, Congress amended this language
to provide the State use the royalty proceeds "for the health, education, and general welfare of
the Navajo Indians residing in San Juan County." Act of May 17, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-306, 82
Stat. 121,121.
23. Texaco, Exxon, & Union Oil, 869 P.2d at 943.




cultural, and legal institutions.' However, in an early decision penned by
Supreme Court Justice John Marshall, the Supreme Court ruled that the tribes'
power to maintain complete sovereignty was diminished due to the doctrine
of discovery.' As a result, the Court held that the tribes, although rightful
occupants of the land, were denied the right to sell the land because the
doctrine of discovery gave the discovering nation exclusive title to the land.'
In a later decision written by Chief Justice John Marshall, the Supreme
Court determined that Indian tribes could not be considered foreign nations
under the United States' Constitution." Subsequently, the Supreme Court
determined that the United States Constitution granted the federal government
sole control over regulating relations with Indian tribes. ' This holding, in
effect, guaranteed the federal government exclusive control over Indian tribes'
political and legal status0 Additionally, the Supreme Court defined this
exclusive relationship between the tribes and the federal government as one
that "resemble[d] that of a ward to [its] guardian."3
During the United States' early years, the executive branch of government
controlled tribal-federal relations through the treaty-making process.' In an
1871 Appropriations Act, Congress forbid the executive branch from making
treaties with the tribes 3 Hence, any federal policies regarding Indian affairs
25. Id.
26. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823).
27. Id. at 254. See generally Felix S. Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 MINN. L. REv. 28
(1947) (discussing thoroughly the doctrine of discovery and Indian land titles).
28. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 11 (1831). In Cherokee Nation, the
Supreme Court held that it did not possess original jurisdiction over disputes between a state and
a tribe. Id. The tribe had claimed Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution provided
the Supreme Court original jurisdiction. Id. Article III, Section 2 grants federal courts jurisdiction
to hear disputes "between a State... and a foreign States, Citizens or Subjects" and grants the
United States Supreme Court the right to hear cases in which a State is a party. U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 2, cls. 1, 2.
29. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-61 (1831). The United States
Constitution only refers to American Indian tribes twice. First, the Constitution, in the Commerce
Clause, grants the federal government the right to regulate trade with Indian tribes. Second, the
Constitution, in Article 1, Section 2, stated that non-taxed Indians would not be counted in
congressional representation districts. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
30. See, e.g., Richard A. Monette, A New Federalism For Indian Tribes: The Relationship
Between the United States and Tribes in Light of Our Federalism And Republican Democracy,
25 U. TOL. L. REV. 617 (1994); Nell Newton, Federal Power over Indians: Its Sources, Scope,
and Limitations, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 195 (1984); see also William E. Nelson, The Eighteenth
Century Background of John Marshall's Constitutional Jurisprudence, 76 MicH. L. REV. 893
(1978) (providing a very good analysis of Chief Justice Marshall's American Indian
jurisprudential holdings).
31. See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 17.
32. See, e.g., Faux S. COHEN's HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 126-27 (Rennard
Strickland et al. eds., 1982) [hereinafter COHEN, HANDBOOK].
33. Act of Mar. 3, 1871, 25 U.S.C. § 71 (1994). The portion of the Bill relating to Indian
tribes stated that "no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be
No. 2]
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would have to be authorized either by acts of Congress or Executive
Orders." Moreover, by forbidding the President's treaty-making power, this
provision eliminated any necessary elements of tribal consent."
Consequently, by effectuating congressional acts as a way of guiding federal
Indian policy, it beGame necessary to determine the intent of any acts passed
by Congress.'
Congress, after giving itself substantial power over Indian affairs, began to
effectuate policy changes with regard to the Indian tribes." At first, Congress
initiated a period of forced assimilation through the implementation of the
General Allotment Act? The policy of allotment was designed to divide up
the large communally held tribal land estates in favor of individual
ownership." The idea behind this policy was to encourage individual
agricultural pursuits while destroying the tribes' communal village existence.
Indeed, after assimilation had occurred, the Allotment Act even considered
whether Indians should be brought under state jurisdiction.4'
The movement to assimilate the American Indians into the mainstream
culture lasted for over fifty years.42 Fortunately, Congress reversed its prior
thought when it passed the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934.43 Instead of
focusing on integrating individual Indians into society, the Indian
Reorganization Act sought to integrate the tribe, as a unit, into society.M In
so doing, Congress provided protection for the tribes' fundamental rights of
political liberty and local self-government.4 Moreover, Congress passed
additional laws,' including the Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938,4" which
acknowledged or recognized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United
States may contract by treaty." Id. The Act was the result of many years of debate between the
House of Representatives and the Senate as to who had control over Indian affairs. See, e.g.,
COHEN, HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 127-28.
34. Id. at 127.
35. d
36. I1. at 127-28.
37. See, e.g., HENRY EUGENE FRITZ, THE MOVEMENTFOR INDIAN ASSIMILATION, 1860-1890
(1963); FREDERICK HOXIE, A FINAL PROMISE: THE CAMPAIGN TO ASSIMILATE THE INDIANS,
1880-1920 (1984).
38. Ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 331-334, 339, 341,
342, 348, 349, 354, 381 (1994)).
39. See, e.g., Judith V. Royster, Article: The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1105
(1995) (detailing allotment policies thoroughly).
40. Id.
41. 25 U.S.C. § 349 (1994).
42. For an in-depth discussion of the allotment era, see Royster, supra note 39, at 7-18.
43. fub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1994)).
44. COHEN, HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 147.
45. Carpenter, supra note 17, at 647. Carpenter's note cited to S. REP. No. 73-1080, at Sess.
3-4 (1934) (letter from President Franklin Roosevelt).
46. Id. at 648. Carpenter's note cited to the Act of Sept. 1, 1937, 25 U.S.C. §§ 500-500n




helped facilitate economic self-sufficiency for tribal governments. The
Indian Reorganization Act, although never disavowed, sustained heavy
criticism over the next twenty years. 9 Nevertheless, this Act was reaffirmed
and strengthened under the Nixon Administration."
B. The Preemption Doctrine
Unlike the frequent changes the tribal sovereignty doctrine has endured, the
federal preemption doctrine, granting Congress plenary power over the tribes,
is still the controlling principle of Indian Law."' Indeed, without affirmative
authorization, the state cannot regulate the tribes.' Today, however, the
federal preemption doctrine is best expressed in terms of jurisdiction. 3
industry); Act of Aug. 27, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-355, 49 Stat. 891 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 305a-305c (1994) (providing for the federal promotion of the Indian arts and crafts
industry).
47. Act of May 11, 1938, Pub. L. No. 75-506, 52 Stat. 347 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. §§ 396a-396g (1994)).
48. COHEN, HANDBOOK, supra note 32, at 152.
49. See generally Charles F. Wilkinson & Eric R. Briggs, The Evolution of the Termination
Policy, 5 Am. INDIAN L. REv. 139 (1977) (discussing the termination era and the various statutes
enacted by Congress subjecting various tribes to state jurisdiction).
50. In 1968 President Nixon stated that he wanted to strengthen tribal sovereignty, transfer
programs from the federal government to the tribal government, and secure Indian land bases.
Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Recommendations for Indian
Policy, H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1968). Indeed, many acts were passed within
several years of this statement giving tribal governments much more power. See, e.g., Indian Self-
Determination and Education Assistance Act, Pub. L. No. 93-638, 88 Stat. 2203 (1975) (codified
at 25 U.S.C. § 450a and elsewhere in scattered sections of 25 U.S.C., 42 U.S.C., 50 U.S.C., and
50 U.S.C. app.) (providing for the strengthening of tribal control over federally funded programs
for Indians including programs for educational assistance to local school districts) and the Indian
Child and Welfare Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-608, 92 Stat. 3069 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1901
(1994)) (providing for maximum tribal jurisdiction and to reduce the exercise of state jurisdiction
in adoption or custody proceedings where the child is a member or could be a member in an
Indian tribe).
51. The first significant case defining the relationship between the tribes, the federal
government, and the states was Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). Worcester
held that all power to regulate the tribes resided with the federal government. Id. at 561.
Moreover, Worcester stated that without federal authorization the states could not act. Id.
Additionally, all powers not expressly taken from the tribes, still resided in the tribes. Id.
Almost a century and a half later, the Supreme Court, in White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1979), reaffirmed Worcester holding that Congress has a broad power to
regulate tribal affairs under the Indian Commerce Clause. Id. at 142-43. Moreover, the Bracker
Court stated that state regulatory authority over the tribes may be thwarted in two ways. First,
state law may be preempted by federal law. Id. at 143. Second, state law may not infringe on
tribal sovereignty. ld.
52. McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 168 (1973). The McClanahan Court
stated, "Indian nations were 'distinct political communities,' having territorial boundaries within
which their authority is exclusive and having a right to all lands within those boundaries." Id. at
169 (quoting Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832)).
53. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 214 (1959). Williams was the first modem case to discuss
No. 2]
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Recent Supreme Court decisions have indicated that the determinative issue
under preemption analysis is whether the state is trying to regulate Indian or
non-Indian activities. Indeed, if the regulated activity concerns non-Indian
activities on Indian land, the question asked is whether state jurisdiction
would interfere with the tribe's right of self government or an express act of
Congress.55 However, if the activity being regulated is solely an Indian
activity on Indian land, then the state has no power over the Indians and
power may only be obtained by an express act of Congress.' Hence, due to
the tribes' unique relationship to the federal government as self-governing
bodies and benefactors of the trust created by the guardian-ward
relationship," the states have no jurisdiction over tribes unless expressly
granted that right by Congress or by treaty.
III. Mineral Development in Indian Country
A. Mineral Leasing in Indian Country
Mineral Leasing in Indian country was first authorized under a statute
enacted in 1891. Written four years after the Allotment Act, the 1891
Mineral Leasing Act resembled the reasoning of the era.59 The oil and gas
the federal preemption doctrine within jurisdictional terms.
54. McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Commn, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973).
55. Williams, 358 U.S. at 219. In Williams, two Navajo Indians were sued in a state court
over their failure to pays debts incurred at a store owned by a non-Indian. Id. at 216. The
Williams Court held that the state had no jurisdiction because state jurisdiction would interfere
with the tribe's right of self-government. Id. at 219.
Since Williams, the doctrine of preemption has been used, for example, to oust state tax
jurisdiction over non-Indians doing business within Indian country, if there was a federal statute
or treaty giving the tribe exclusive tax jurisdiction over the non-Indian activity or if the state
interfered to an impermissible extent with the ability of the tribe to govern itself. See Central
Mach. Co. v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 482 U.S. 160, 169 (1980) (federal statute); Ramah Navajo
Sch. Bd. v. New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832, 848 (1982) (federal statute); Crow Tribe of Indians v.
New Mexico, 484 U.S. 997, 1013 (1988) (impermissible state interference).
56. McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 173. In McClanahan, the Court held that the State of Arizona
could not impose their state income tax on a member Navajo Indian who derived his income from
reservation sources. Id.
57. For a very good article detailing the trust relationship between the tribes and the states,
see Judith V. Royster, Proceedings: Papers Presented and Commentary: Equivocal Obligations:
The Federal-Tribal Trust Relationship and Conflicts of Interest in the Development of Mineral
Resources, 71 N.D. L. REv. 327 (1995).
58. 25 U.S.C. § 397 (1994).
59. The 1891 Act permitted 10-year mineral leases on Indian lands set aside by treaty or
agreement. Id. The leases required the consent of the tribes as well as the approval of the
Secretary of Interior. Id. Moreover, tribes were prohibited from leasing land that was needed for
agriculture or individual allotment. Id. Finally, Congress believed that non-Indian development
of mineral resources was necessary because it would constitute an efficient and wise use of the





section of the 1891 Mineral Leasing Act was amended in 1924 and 1927
respectively. The 1924 amendment5 ' applied to tribal lands within treaty
reservations, and the 1927 amendment" applied to tribal lands created by
executive order.' Taken collectively, these acts specifically authorized state
taxation of oil and gas production but also regulated all mineral extraction."
However, within ten years of the 1927 amendment, a major reformation
occurred in mineral leasing law.
Not surprisingly, this reformation coincided with the waning era of
assimilation and the rising era of tribal self-government.' This reformation
did not destroy all prior mineral leasing law. Indeed, several areas of mineral
leasing law have remained constant throughout these eras. First, under mineral
leasing law guidelines, tribal governments have generally been restricted to
the role of the lessor, leaving tribal governments little control over most
leases.6' Second, tribal mineral land, like tribal land, is held in trust by the
federal government.' Finally, tribal mineral land may not be encumbered
without the consent of Congress.'
B. The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938
The Indian Mineral Leasing Act of 1938 was passed by Congress to
promote tribal economic and political self-sufficiency.7" In doing so, the
1938 Act developed consistent laws to govern mineral leasing, promoted
economic development by ensuring maximum profits on minerals, and
encouraged using profits to achieve tribal economic and political self-
60. Other portions of the 1891 Mineral Leasing Act were amended over the years. For
example, in 1919 Congress amended the 1891 Act to include mining gold, silver, copper, and
other valuable minerals. 25 U.S.C. § 399 (1994). This Act also eliminated tribal consent to
leasing. Id.
61. Id. § 398.
62. Id. §§ 398a-398e.
63. The two amendments taken collectively authorized the Secretary of Interior to lease oil
and gas lands, with the consent of the tribes, for up to 10 years (or as long as royalties are being
paid) following competitive bidding. Id. §§ 398-398a.
64. Id. § 398. Before this express congressional authorization, states were forbidden from
taxing non-Indian lessees. See, e.g., Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501 (1922) (invalidating
a tax on a non-Indian oil and gas lessee). The 1924 Act specifically authorized any assessed state
taxes that fell upon non-Indian oil and gas lessees to be specifically taken from the royalties. 25
U.S.C. § 398c (1994). The 1927 Act specifically authorized states to tax bonuses, rents, and
royalties. Id.
65. See infra Part III.B.
66. For more on the tribal self-government era, see supra notes 42-50 and accompanying
text.
67. Royster, supra note 8, at 552.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. S. REP. No. 75-985, at 2-3 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 75-1872, at 1-3 (1938).
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sufficiency." The overall effect was to facilitate the tribe's role in mineral
development.'
One of the purposes of the 1938 Act was to ensure consistency throughout
Indian mineral law.' Indeed, to achieve this, the act required a single set of
procedures to govern Indian mineral law transactions.74 However, the 1938
Act did not disallow several inconsistent areas of Indian mineral law." First,
the 1938 Act did not repeal any earlier mineral law acts, unless those acts
contained express provisions inconsistent with the 1938 Act.76 Second, the
1938 Act did not extend its scope to leases made on allotted lands.7 Finally,
the 1938 Act excluded certain tribes from coverage."
Another purpose of the 1938 Act was to provide for tribal political and
economic self-government.' The 1938 Act granted tribes the right to consent
to any mineral leases entered into on tribal lands.' Any lease entered into
by the tribe, however, still had to be approved by the Secretary of Interior."
Moreover, the Secretary of Interior was given the power to revoke a lease at
any time if the lessee had violated any term or condition in the agreement or
if a lease had been entered into in error.' Such power was granted to the
Secretary of Interior because the federal government has continually
analogized that the tribes relationship with the federal government is like that
of wards to a guardian. 3
The 1938 Act, in connection with the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act,'
sought to provide the tribes with a means of economical survival.
Accordingly, when Congress passed the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act,
Congress wanted to ensure that the tribes would retain "the greatest return
71. 25 U.S.C. § 396 (1994).
72. Royster, supra note 8, at 552.
73. M. at 559.
74. hM. All leases required approval and consent of the Secretary of Interior, could not
exceed ten years (or as long as royalties were being derived therefrom), and would only be
granted after competitive bidding. 25 U.S.C. § 396a (1994).
75. See generally Royster, supra note 8, at 558-59.
76. Id. (citing to Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 759, 764 (1985)).
77. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 396a (1994)).
78. Id. (citing to 25 U.S.C. § 396f (1994)). Provision 396f excluded the Papago, Crow, and
Osage Reservations, the ceded lands of the Shoshone [Wind River] Reservation, and the coal and
asphalt lands of the Oklahoma Choctaw and Chickasaw. Twenty years later, Congress allowed
the Papago, Shoshone and Crow lands to be included within the scope of the 1938 Act. Act of
May 27, 1958, ch. 106, § 2, 69 Stat. 67, 67, 67-68.
79. See generally Royster, supra note 8, at 560-71.
80. 25 U.S.C. § 396a (1994).
81. Id.
82. Royster, supra note 8, at 564 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 211.27(a) (1995)).
83. Briefly, the ward-guardian distinction was first made in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia. See
supra note 31 and accompanying text.




from their property."' Indeed, the Act required the Interior Department,
acting in its trusteeship role, to establish a system of rents, bonuses, and
royalties to guarantee income.' Hence, the 1938 Act would provide tribal
governmental entities with the needed funds to facilitate economic strength,
thereby facilitating political strength and power."
C. Preemption Analysis and Mineral Leasing
During the first quarter of this century, the United States Supreme Court,
under the governmental tax immunity doctrine, invalidated any state taxes
imposed on non-Indian lessees.' However, Congress authorized taxation of
non-Indian oil and gas lessees in the 1924 and 1927 Acts.' Several years
later, the Supreme Court invalidated the governmental tax immunity
doctrine.' Instead, the Supreme Court held that states were allowed to
impose nondiscriminatory taxes on non-Indian lands unless Congress
impliedly or expressly prohibited such taxation?'
The 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act did not expressly authorize taxation
of lessees on Indian lands. Nevertheless, states continued to tax mineral
lessees.' Finally, after forty years of taxation, the Interior Department in
1977 ruled that states were not allowed to tax mineral leases signed pursuant
to the 1938 Act.93 Subsequently, many tribes began to challenge the
continued imposition of state taxes.
The first case to come before the Supreme Court was Montana v. Blackfeet
Tribe of Indians.' The Blackfeet Tribe brought suit against the State of
Montana for taxing oil and gas production under the 1938 Act The
Supreme Court held that the taxation was invalid because it fell on Indian
85. S. REP. No. 75-985, at 2 (1937); H.R. REP. No. 75-1872, at 2 (1938).
86. Royster, supra note 8, at 565 (citing 25 U.S.C. § 396c (1994)). Royster also notes that
these provisions failed badly due to royalty mismanagement, inadequate accounting practices, and
mineral theft. kL at 567.
87. Indeed, without economic power, political strength will be diluted. Hence, the United
States' political and economic well-being has rested on its ability to control its landed interests.
Likewise, whoever controls the land and the lands resources reap all the economic profits and
such control translates into political strength as well.
88. See supra note 64. Briefly, the Supreme Court, in Gillespie v. Oklahoma, 257 U.S. 501
(1922), invalidated a tax that fell on a non-Indian oil and gas lessee. Id. at 504. The Supreme
Court disallowed the tax due to the governmental tax immunity doctrine. Id. This doctrine
reasoned that a tax on an entity doing business with the government was a tax on the government
itself. Id.
89. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
90. See Helvering v. Mountain Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376, 386-87 (1938).
91. Id.
92. Royster, supra note 8, at 572.
93. Id.
94. 471 U.S. 759 (1985).
95. Id. at 761.
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lessees. 6 Moreover, the Court noted that nothing in the 1938 Act authorized
taxation of Indian lessees.' Indeed, the Court argued that a contrary holding
would contradict the express purpose of the 1938 Act."
The Blackfeet Tribe Court, however, failed to discuss whether state taxation
imposed on non-Indian oil and gas lessees would violate the 1938 Act. In
Crow Tribe of Indians v. Montana,' the United States Supreme Court
affirmed, without opinion, a Ninth Circuit decision considering that issue. The
Ninth Circuit found that the State of Montana had placed a 33% on non-
Indian mineral lessees."D The Ninth Circuit held that state taxes on non-
Indian mineral lessees would be preempted if the tribe could prove that the
taxes interfered with the purposes of the 1938 Act.' Accordingly, when the
Ninth Circuit discovered the negative impact this tax had on mineral
development, the Court struck down the state tax.' 2
The very next year the Supreme Court revisited the issue in Cotton
Petroleum v. New Mexico." Pursuant to the 1938 Act, Cotton Petroleum
operated sixty-five oil wells on the Jicarilla reservation land." Both the
Jicarilla Apache Tribe and the State of New Mexico collected severance taxes
and rental fees."' Moreover, New Mexico collected five additional taxes
equaling approximately 8% of the total production value."
The Supreme Court, per Justice Stevens, determined that the tribe and the
state had concurrent tax jurisdiction over a non-Indian lessee." In so
determining, the Court first argued that the 1938 Act was not designed to
remove all barriers to profit maximization."" Rather, the 1938 Act was only
designed to provide a source of revenue for the tribes." According to the
Court, state taxation on non-Indian lessees could only be invalidated if the
96. Id. at 768.
97. Id. at 766.
98. Id. at 767.
99. 819 F.2d 895 (9th Cir. 1987), affd men. 484 U.S. 997 (1988) (Crow I1).
100. Id at 897.
101. Id. at 898.
102. lit at 903.
103. 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
104. Id. at 168.
105. Id. at 167-69.
106. 1d
107. Id at 186-87. Many articles have fiercely criticized this opinion. See, e.g., Carpenter,
supra note 17; Kristina Bogardus, Note, Court Picks New Test in Cotton Petroleum, 30 NAT.
REsOURCES J. 919 (1990); Katherine B. Crawford, Note, State Authority to Tax Non-Indian Oil
and Gas from Indian Reservations: Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 2 UTAH L. REV. 495
(1989).





taxation placed too great of a burden on tribes or intruded too much into tribal
or federal affairs."
Nevertheless, the Court ruled that none of these factors existed under New
Mexico's taxation scheme."' First, the Court found that the federal
government did not exclusively regulate Indian mineral leasing."' Indeed,
the State of New Mexico regulated the spacing and integrity of the wells
located on the reservation."' Second, the Court stated that the 8% tax did
not have a substantially negative impact on the development of oil and gas
resources or tribal revenue derived therefrom."' Thus, the primary burden
was slight and the brunt of the taxes fell on the non-Indian lessee."5
Consequently, the Supreme Court allowed the tax to stand.
IV. Texaco, Exxon, and Union Oil Co. v. San Juan
County School District
A. The Facts and Legal History of the Case
Under a 1933 Act, Congress added 552,000 acres of land to the Navajo
Indian Reservation."' This land, located in Utah, was denoted in the Act as
the Aneth Extension."7 However, of the 552,000 acres, only 52,000 acres
actually bore the Aneth Extension name."' The other 500,000 acres were
located in the Paiute Strip.'"
The 1933 Act expressly granted "37 1/2% of the net royalties from any oil
or gas leases on the Aneth Extension... to the state of Utah for the benefit
of the Indians residing in the Aneth Extension."2" Starting in 1953, the
Navajo Nation began leasing portions of the Aneth Extension to oil companies
pursuant to the 1938 Indian Mineral Leasing Act.' The oil and gas
companies paid the State of Utah the aforementioned royalties from 1953
110. Id. at 185-86.
111. Id.
112. Id.; see also Royster, supra note 8, at 577. Royster, citing White Mountain Apache
Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 148 (1980), stated that prior analysis had also focused on the
pervasiveness or comprehensiveness of a federal scheme, not the exclusivity of a federal scheme.
Moreover, Royster noted that the Supreme Court never specified the state's authority to regulate
such matters. Royster, supra note 8, at 577.
113. Cotton Petroleum, 490 U.S. at 185-86.
114. Id. at 187.
115. Id.
116. Texaco, Exxon, & Union Oil v. San Juan County, 869 P.2d 942 (Utah 1994); see also
Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 383, 26 Stat. 795 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 397 (1994)) (the 1891 Act).
117. Texaco, Exxon, & Union Oil, 869 P.2d at 943.
118. 1I at 944. The Aneth Extension lies along the Utah-Colorado border. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 943.
121. Id.
No. 2]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1997
AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW
through 1974 and any additional state taxes imposed by Utah.' " In 1978, the
Navajo tribe began taxing all oil and gas lessees, including those in the Aneth
Extension."
The 1933 Act, however, did not specify whether revenues derived by non-
Indian lessees would be taxable by the state government." Consequently,
the oil and gas companies, after paying their state taxes under protest, filed
suit in the Seventh District Court opposing the imposition of state production
taxes on non-Indian lessees on Indian lands."r The oil and gas companies
alleged that Congress had provided royalties be paid instead of taxation."
Accordingly, the companies argued that such reasoning was proved by
Congress' failure to expressly provide for state taxation of non-Indian lessees
on Indian land."
Meanwhile, the United States Supreme Court decided Cotton Petroleum
Corp. v. New Mexico, which allowed New Mexico state to tax non-Indian
lessees' oil revenues under the 1938 Act.Iu As a result, some of the oil and
gas companies voluntarily dismissed their claims against the State of Utah.'
However Texaco, Exxon, and Union Oil, maintained that Cotton Petroleum
did not apply.'
The district court held that Cotton Petroleum controlled since the 1933 Act
did not prohibit state taxation on non-Indian oil and gas lessees.''
Therefore, the district court allowed the state and local entities to continue
taxing oil and gas production within the Aneth Extension.' Subsequently,
Texaco, Exxon, and Union Oil appealed to the Utah Supreme Court.'
B. The Utah Supreme Court's Holding
The Utah Supreme Court stated that the issue before the court was whether
the 1933 Act, which was silent on the issue of taxation, prevented the state
from taxing non-Indian lessees' revenues on the Aneth Extension.' To
preempt Utah's state tax, the court established that the oil and gas companies
would have to show a clear congressional intent to forbid "powers otherwise







128. See supra notes 103-15 and accompanying text.










Exxon, Texaco, and Union Oil argued that the 1933 Act's silence
demonstrated an affirmative action to incorporate the then-governing 1922
Gillespie rule." In Gillespie, the United States Supreme Court invalidated
a state tax on non-Indian oil lessees on Indian land. 37 The United States
Supreme Court did not specifically overrule Gillespie until 1938."3
The Utah Supreme Court maintained, however, that the 1933 Act, which
was silent on the issue of taxation, only authorized the addition of the Aneth
Extension to the Navajo Reservation.'39 Moreover, the court recognized that
Gillespie had been invalidated fifteen years before the Navajo nation had
leased tribal land to the oil companies.'" Accordingly, since the 1933 Act
did not apply, the Utah Supreme Court held that the 1938 Act governed. 4'
Therefore, the court allowed the State of Utah to tax the interest in oil and gas
leases on the Aneth Extension.'42
V. The Navajo Nation and the Aneth Strip
The Navajo Nation was established by executive treaty in 1868."43 Under
the original treaty, the Navajo Nation contained 3,414,528 acres.'" This
acreage, however, only comprised 10% of the land that the Navajos had
136. Id.
137. Id. at 944; see supra note 64. As a result of the Gillespie holding, Congress authorized
taxation of non-Indian oil and gas lessees on Indian lands in 1924 and 1927 amendments to the
1891 Mineral Leasing Act. 25 U.S.C. § 398 (1994).
138. Texaco, Exxon, & Union Oil, 869 P.2d at 944.




143. See Treaty with the Navajo Indians, June 1, 1868, 15 Stat. 667. The people of the
Navajo nation are distinct from other Indian groups because of their diverse ancestral heritage.
See David M. Brugge, Navajo Prehistory and History to 1850, in 10 HANDBOOK OF NORTH
AMERICAN INDIANS 493 (Alfonso Ortiz ed., 1983) [hereinafter HANDBOOK OF INDIANS]. The
Navajo peoples ancestral roots developed from two distinct cultures. Id. The first ancestral root
was comprised of an Apachean band of Indians that migrated into the area approximately 1000
years ago. Id. at 489. The second culture was comprised of an Anasazi-Puebloan band of Indians
that had originally inhabited the area. Il at 493. These two cultures fused around 1700 with the
Apaches de Nabajo culture providing its linguistic and political customs and the Puebloan culture
providing its theological customs. Id.
In the early Navajo society, political organizations were local in nature. See Gary
Witherspoon, Navajo Social Organization, in 10 HANDBOOK OF INDIANS, supra, at 531. Indeed,
until the early 1900s, local groups handled both internal and external matters. Id. In most groups,
an organization called a residence group would be formed to manage internal matters while a
local headmen would be engaged to supervise external matters (including the power to negotiate
with other Navajo groups, Indian tribes, and non-Indians). Id.
144. See Robert A. Roessel, Jr., Navajo History, 1850-1923, in 10 HANDBOOK OF INDIANS,
supra note 143, at 519.
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originally inhabited. 45 Problems developed shortly thereafter as non-Navajos
moved into areas traditionally inhabited by Navajos." Hence, to quell
tensions between the Navajos and non-Navajos, various congressional acts and
executive orders provided for the expansion of the Navajos original land
base. 47 As a result of these enactments, the reservation tripled in size over
a sixty-year period."
One portion of land that was added to the Navajo reservation during this
period was the Aneth Extension. 4" The Aneth Extension was a very small
strip of land located in southeastern Utah." Congress added the Extension
to the Navajo reservation in a 1933 Act."' However, the factual history
behind the 1933 Act can be described as egregious at best.
Under the 1933 Act, Congress provided that if oil and gas was found on
the Ane-th Extension 37.5% of all royalties would go to the State of Utah for
"payment of the tuition of Indian children in white schools, and/or in the
building or maintenance of roads across the lands ... for the benefit of
Indians residing therein."'" However, the Utah congressional delegation was
already aware of the oil and gas discoveries that had been made in this
region.153 Therefore, the delegation, after some coaxing, was able to
implement legislation allowing the State of Utah to receive 37.5% of all oil
and gas royalties." Furthermore, Utah was granted the right to renounce
145. Id. at 520.
146. Id
147. Id Over a 60-year period, various portions of land were both added to and subtracted
from the Navajo reservation. Id. For a thorough discussion of the various enactments and a visual
map showing each enactment, see id. at 520.
148. hI.
149. d
150. Id Indeed, only 52,000 acres of land comprised the Aneth Extension. Texaco, Exxon,
& Union Oil v. San Juan County, 869 P.2d 942, 943 (Utah 1994).
151. RAYMOND FRIDAY LOCKE, THE BOOK OF THE NAvAJO 432 (5th ed. 1992). It should
be noted that all the sources that this author has consulted, except one, have referred to the land
granted under the 1933 Act as the Aneth Extension. However, Locke stated that this addition was
called the Aneth Strip. Id. According to Locke, the Aneth Extension was granted to the tribe
under a 1905 Act. Id. at 428. This grant of land, encompassing 56,953 acres due south of the
Aneth Strip, was added to the reservation under the reign of Indian Commissioner Francis E.
Leupp. Id
152. Id at 432. The 37.5% royalty provision in the 1933 Act was not an arbitrary percentage
rate pulled out of thin air. Instead, this royalty provision was identical to the taxation rate levied
by the 1927 amendment. Mary Shepardson, Development of Navajo Tribal Government, in 10
HANDBOOK OF INDIANS, supra note 143, at 626. Indeed, it led Shepardson to stale that the 1927
Indian Oil Act "still governs the use of oil revenue from Navajo land in Utah." Id. For more on
the 1927 Amendment, see supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
153. L cKE, supra note 151, at 432. Unfortunately, all the cases discussing the 1933 Act
have failed to mention this important factor. For example, in United States v. Jim, 409 U.S. 80
(1972), the Supreme Court asserted that oil and gas was discovered on the Aneth Extension after
the passage of the Act. Id at 81.




reservation school tracts.' This, in effect, freed the State of Utah from the
responsibility of providing schools for the Indians living on the Aneth
Extension while still allowing the state to collect a percentage of Navajo oil
and gas royalties for that purpose."
In 1968, Congress amended the 1938 Act and required the State of Utah
to use the royalty proceeds to provide "for the health, education, and general
welfare of the Navajo Indians residing in San Juan County."'" Nevertheless,
the funds collected under the royalty provision have never reached the peoples
of the Aneth Extension.55 For example, most of the native dwellers live
either in ragtag governmental tract houses or traditional round earthen hogan
dwellings."9 Moreover, 60% of these inhabitants do not having running
water or electricity." ° Furthermore, almost 95% of these inhabitants have
problems reading or writing. 6' Not surprisingly, these findings have caused
many to maintain that the inhabitants of the Aneth Extension are the most
impoverished people not only in the State of Utah but in the entire Navajo
Nation.'"
As a result of this abject poverty, some concerned citizens began to wonder
where all of the royalty proceeds were going. Indeed, the State of Utah
received $61 million in royalty proceeds between 1960-1990.m However,
a recent audit revealed that only $9.5 million remained in the trust fund
leaving the state accountable for the other $51.5 million.'6 Obviously, those
funds have not been spent on the residents of the Aneth Extension. Hence, the
state confessed that it had recklessly squandered $51.5 million."m
155. Il at 432-33. The state was given the right upon renouncement to select like tracts of
equal acreage outside of the Aneth Extension. Id. at 433.
156. Id. at 433.
157. Act of May 17, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-306, 82 Stat. 121.
158. The inhabitants of the Aneth Extension are not purely of Navajo decent. Instead, these
inhabitants were a mixture of Navajo and Piute (as spelled in the opinion). Jim, 409 U.S. at 84.
Hence, there is a distinct blood-line difference between the inhabitants of the Aneth Extension
and the inhabitants of the Navajo Nation. Id.
159. Florence Williams, Navajos Push For Political Clout, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug.
28, 1990, at 7 [hereinafter Williams, Navajos Push for Clout]; Nancy Lofholm, Despite Prayers,
a Navajo-Mormon Cultural Clash, N.Y. TIMEs, July 24, 1996, at A16.
160. Lofholm, supra note 159, at A16.
161. Williams, Navajos Push for Clout, supra note 159, at 7.
162. Id.
163. Florence Williams, Utah Freezes Navajo Fund as Report Details Scandal; American
Indians: An Audit Alleges State, as Trustee, Looked the Other Way as Oil Royalty Trust Account
Was Plundered, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 25, 1992, at A18 [hereinafter Williams, Utah Freezes Navajo
Trust Fund]. Conversely, the Navajo Nation has received 62.5% of these royalties equaling
approximately 85.83 million dollars between 1960-1990. However, the Navajo Nation spent very
little on the Aneth Extension people. Williams, Navajos Push for Clout, supra note 159, at 7.
Overall, between 1960-1990, the Aneth Extension generated $137.33 million.
164. Williams, Utah Freezes Navajos Fund, supra note 163, at A18.
165. Id. The royalties have been used for all types of non-Indian projects. For example,
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The impoverished Aneth Extension residents will never see the $51.5
million the State of Utah squandered, and it is questionable, noting prior
history, if these people will ever see any of the royalty proceeds generated
from this land." Nevertheless, Utah officials must not believe that the initial
37.5% of the royalty proceeds is enough to adequately care for the Aneth
Extension peoples. Indeed, the state finds it necessary to place an additional
tax on oil and gas production. In the next section, this comment will argue
that this additional tax should be invalidated because it contravenes the
purposes of the 1933 and 1968 Acts.
VI. Why Cotton Petroleum Should Not Apply
The Cotton Petroleum decision has been greatly criticized by scholars. 67
Nevertheless, it remains the controlling doctrine in this area of Federal Indian
law. Under Cotton Petroleum, the Supreme Court provided that taxes on non-
Indian lessees could be invalidated if the tax substantially burdened the tribe
or greatly encroached upon tribal and/or federal affairs." Next, to determine
whether the aforementioned factors occurred, the Court analyzed several areas
including whether the tax interfered with a comprehensive federal regulatory
scheme, whether the state regulated the taxed product," and whether the tax
funds have been used to build airports, roads, schools, and a museum all in an anglo town many
miles north of the reservation. Williams, Navajos Push for Clout, supra note 159, at 7. Recently,
the State of Utah reenacted the Aneth Extension Trust Fund Statute in an attempt to protect
against the possibility of royalty left. Navajo Revitalization Fund Act, UTAH CODE ANN. § 9-11-
107 (Supp. 1996). This same statute, which was originally enacted in 1959, had been repealed
one year earlier. Id.
166. It should be noted that the Aneth Extension residents, as beneficiaries of the Utah
Navajo Trust Fund, have recently won a major legal battle. Indeed, in Pelt et al. and The Navajo
Nation v. State of Utah, Nos. 95-4135, 95-4136, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 33970 (10th Cir. Dec.
31, 1996), the United States Court of Appeals held that the beneficiaries of the Utah Navajo Trust
Fund had an implied cause of action for breach of common law fiduciary duty against the State
of Utah. Id. at *28. The appellate court, after determining this, remanded the case for retrial. Id.
at *2.
As a result of the appellate court's unanimous three-judge decision, the Utah Attorney
General's Office has petitioned the entire 10th Circuit Court of Appeals for reconsideration.
Christopher Smith, Navajos Want State to Restore Embezzled Millions; Navajos Not Giving Up
Fight For Millions, SALT LAKE TarE., Jan. 19, 1997, at Cl. The beneficiaries are claiming that
the State of Utah has squandered between $52 million and $100 million dollars. Id. However,
these residents have yet to see any monetary benefits. Therefore, in light of previous history,
success can not be measured by the number of court decisions ascertained. Instead, success can
only be measured by action on said subjects.
167. See supra note 107.
168. Cotton Petroleum v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 185 (1989).
169. Id. at 186-87. The Court noted that it would strike down a tax provision if it was
enacted only to raise revenue or if it was used to supplement non-Indian tax rates off the
reservation. Id. at 185-87. Moreover, the Court stated that any tribal regulation of the taxed
activity should also be given some consideration in determining whether a state tax provision
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol21/iss2/5
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negatively impacted tribal revenue and/or resource development.7 ' The
Court, after examining these factors, allowed the state to continue taxing the
non-Indian lessees.1
7'
The Cotton Petroleum Court upheld the state tax for several reasons. First,
the federal government did not exclusively regulate Indian mineral leasing
since the State of New Mexico was found to have regulated the spacing and
integrity of the wells.'" Second, the brunt of the taxes fell on the non-Indian
producers; therefore, the tax did not negatively impact the tribe.'" Finally,
the State of New Mexico used these taxes to provide services to the tribe."
The scope and breadth of the Cotton Petroleum decision has been narrowly
interpreted by several federal appellate courts. These courts have
distinguished their cases from Cotton Petroleum on factual grounds. 76 In
Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevens, the appellate court, after finding that the
federal government had established a comprehensive regulatory scheme,
invalidated a state tax on timber operations.'" Moreover, in Gila River
Indian Community v. Waddell, the appellate court invalidated a state tax even
though the state provided some services in connection with the taxed
good. 70 Finally, in Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. California, the
appellate court disallowed concurrent taxation even though the state had
traditionally regulated the taxed activity."
In Texaco, Exxon, and Union Oil, the Utah Supreme Court, unlike the
other lower federal courts, failed to determine whether Utah had violated any
of the tax invalidation factors listed in Cotton Petroleum."' If the Utah court
had utilized the Cotton Petroleum factors, the court would have found that
Utah's tax policy clearly violated tribal sovereignty. First, the State of Utah






175. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians v. California, 37 F.3d 430 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1055 (1992); Gila River Indian Community v. Waddell, 967 F.2d 1404 (9th Cir.
1992); Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Nevins, 881 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1989).
176. See Wadell, 967 F.2d at 1410-11; Nevins, 881 F.2d at 660.
177. Nevins, 881 F.2d at 660. The state admitted that there was no connection between the
tax and any services it provided tribal members. Id. at 660.
178. Waddell, 967 F.2d at 1410-11.
179. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 37 F.3d at 435. In Cabazon, the state was regulating
race-track betting. Id. at 432.
180. The Utah Supreme Court stated that after 1938 "states were allowed to impose
nondiscriminatory taxes on non-Indian lessees on Indian lands unless Congress prohibited such
taxation, either expressly or impliedly." Texaco, Exxon, & Union Oil v. San Juan County, 869
P.2d 942, 944 (Utah 1994). However, the Court did not consider whether Utah's tax was
nondiscriminatory nor did it consider any of the other invalidation provisions discussed in Cotton
Petroleum.
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did not have an established regulatory scheme governing the oil wells on the
Aneth Extension.' Indeed, the State of Utah did not specifically regulate
the spacing or the integrity of wells located on the Aneth Extension.'
However, even if the state did regulate the wells, it should not be allowed
to tax the oil and gas proceeds. Instead, to prevent the negative effects that
result from concurrent tribal and state taxation, any expenses incurred by the
state should be taken from royalty proceeds provided under the 1933 Act.'
The 1933 Act, as amended in 1968, provides for funds to be used for the
"health, education, and general welfare" of the Navajos.'" Hence, paying the
taxes under the 1968 Act's "general welfare" provision would leave the tribe
and the state on the same footing when competing for non-Indian oil and gas
lessees, thereby allowing the tribe to continue to receive more royalties in the
long term." As a result, the federal goal of promoting tribal self-
government is also fulfilled because the tribe is receiving more funds."
Second, the State of Utah did not have to provide services to tribal
members with these taxation proceeds. As aforementioned, Congress had
already authorized the state to use 37.5% of the royalties on tribal
members.' Indeed, over a thirty-year period, the state had received $61
million in royalty proceeds." Hence, since the state had already been
allocated a substantial amount of monies, the state should not have to retax
the tribe's resources.'
181. The Utah Court did hot list any reasons or uses for the tax. The state statute on oil and
gas taxation authorizes the state to tax all oil and gas wells within the state. UTAH GEN. STAT.
§ 40-6-14 (1993 & Supp. 1996). It also allows a state board to impose regulations. Id. § 40-6-5,
40-6-14 (993). Nevertheless, no impending statutory regulations seem to have been imposed on
the Aneth Extension.
In 1960, the State of Utah had established 80-acre drilling and spacing units for the Greater
Aneth Area. Harkin Southwest Corp. v. Board of Oil, Gas And Mining, Dep't of Natural
Resources, State of Utah, 920 P.2d 1176, 1178 (Utah 1996). However, the Harkin opinion did
not indicate whether this regulation included the Aneth Extension.
Moreover, the Navajo tribe, under the encouragement of the BIA, enacted a provision
allowing the tribe to monitor and regulate any oil and gas wells located on their lands. NAVAJO
NAiON CODE tit. 18, § 1401-03 (Equity 1995). The BIA has encouraged such tribal regulations
because the BIA hopes that tribal involvement will deter oil and gas royalty left. Federal Oil and
Gas Management Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1751 (1994). The Act specifically authorized the
Secretary of the Interior to work with tribes on inspections. Id.
182. See supra note 181.
183. The negative effects dual taxation has on a non-Indian lessee is one of great concern.
Indeed, if a non-Indian lessee is taxed once by the tribe and once by the state, the lessee is
incurring a larger loss by drilling on Indian lands. Consequently, the lessee receives more profits
if he does not drill on Indian land. This in effect reduces the amount of drilling on Indian land,
and hence, the amount of profits derived therefrom.
184. See supra note 157 and accompanying text.
185. See supra note 181.
186. See supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 152, 157 and accompanying text.
188. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.




Third, dual taxation by the Navajo tribe and the State of Utah does
negatively impact tribal revenue. The dual taxation levels under both Cotton
Petroleum and Exxon, Texaco, & Union Oil are minimal. However, in the
later case, the federal government already provided for the state to receive
37.5% of the royalty proceeds." ° Hence, the 1933 Act authorized a level of
funding comparable to taxation. Therefore, any additional taxation measures
should be invalidated because such high levels of taxation impacts tribal
revenue negatively.
Since the Exxon, Texaco, & Union Oil case fails all three Cotton Petroleum
factors, the ruling greatly encroaches upon tribal and federal affairs. Indeed,
the Navajo Tribe is losing revenues due to this decision and therefore, is
unable to fully achieve economic and political self-sufficiency. This result
runs contrary to the goals of the 1938 Mineral Rights Act and the 1934 Indian
Reorganization Act."" The 1938 Act was passed to provide tribal
governmental entities with the needed funds to facilitate economic strength,
thereby facilitating political strength and power. Hence, when the Utah court
allowed dual taxation it robbed the Navajo nation once again of a chance to
gain political and economic power.
VII. Conclusion
This comment has maintained that the tribes and the states should not
always have concurrent taxation jurisdiction over non-Indian oil and gas
lessees. Indeed, after carefully examining Texaco, Exxon, & Union Oil v. San
Juan County, a compelling argument can be made for disallowing the state to
share concurrent tax jurisdiction with the tribe over non-Indian oil and gas
lessees. Such a holding, however, would not explicitly violate the Cotton
Petroleum doctrine. Cotton Petroleum specifically followed preemption
analysis. Therefore, if a future court were to find that a state taxation scheme
significantly affected the development of oil and gas production, then the non-
Indian oil and gas lessees could be exempt from state taxation. Hence, after
examining the egregious nature of the 1933 Act, Cotton Petroleum should not
be followed because applying the doctrine would intrude too greatly into tribal
and/or federal affairs.
The courts must protect the tribes from unlawful state intrusions into tribal
affairs. Indeed, as President Theodore Roosevelt indicated, the United States
is a nation that thrives on expansion." This cost the Indians their land base.
It also cost the Indians the ability to fully control their resources. However,
text. Yet the state still has the audacity to retax oil and gas proceeds on tribal land. When is
enough "enough"?
190. See supra note 152 (stating that the royalty percentage rate authorized under the 1933
Act and the oil and gas taxation rate in 1933 were both 37.5%).
191. See supra notes 70-87 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note I and accompanying text.
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it should not cost the Indians the ability to reap the full benefit of their
resources. Hence, the courts should not allow unwarranted expansion, like the
State of Utah's dual taxation scheme, to impede the Indian's right to self-
government.
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